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Abstract
We study Pareto optimal tax and education policies when human capital upon labor
market entry is endogenous and individuals face wage uncertainty. Though optimal
labor distortions are history-dependent, i.e. depend on income and education, simple
policy instruments can yield the desired distortions: a single nonlinear labor income tax
schedule combinedwith income-contingent loans. To take themodel to the (US) data, we
simplify the model to a binary education decision (graduating from college or not). We
find that for low and intermediate incomes the labor supply decision of college graduates
should be distorted more heavily than for individuals without a college degree. As a
consequence, the optimal student loan repayment schedule increases in income for this
range. This result holds along the Pareto frontier. We compare the second best to a
situation where loan repayment is restricted to be independent from income and find
significant welfare gains.
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1 Introduction
The deepening wage and income inequality observed in many countries over the last
several decades is often linked to changes in the relative returns to education. In a
recent survey, Acemoglu and Autor (2011) note that the college premium has been
rising steadily in the US for the last 30 years. The same holds true for many other
advanced economies, as an increasing college wage premium has contributed to an
increase in the dispersion of the distribution of wages and income (Krueger, Perri,
Pistaferri and Violante 2010).
Motivated by this tight connection between economic inequality and differences
in educational attainment, we tackle the optimal design of integrated income tax and
education policy systems in this paper. We analyze a dynamic heterogeneous agents
economy, which consists of an education and a working period. Unlike former pa-
pers in the literature, we assume both, that individuals are ex-ante heterogeneous
and the educational investment is risky.1 The resulting Pareto optimal labor distor-
tions are history-dependent, implying that implicit tax rates should condition on edu-
cation in addition to income. History-dependent allocations and labor wedges are a
standard outcome in dynamic tax problems (Golosov, Tsyvinski and Werning 2007,
Kocherlakota 2010). We show that in our setting Pareto optimal allocations can be
implemented by simple policy instruments: income-contingent student loans in ad-
dition to standard taxes on labor earnings and savings.
We apply our model to the case of a binary education decision: going to college or
entering the labor market directly after high-school. We use income data to calibrate
our model. The main focus of this numerical exercise is on the following question:
given that we know that income-contingent student loans implement the optimum,
how should they vary with income? We find that the optimal repayment schemes are
– along the Pareto frontier – increasing for low and intermediate income at an almost
linear slope. A second questionwe address is: canwe gauge the welfare gains of such
policies relative to simpler policies? We compare the optimal policies to a scenario
where repayment cannot be income-contingent and find significant welfare gains.
The idea of income-contingent student loans has been proposed as early as 1955
1With the exception of Bénabou (2002), no paper has looked at optimal policies in a framework with het-
erogeneity and uncertainty yet. His approach differs from ours in that he does not solve for the second-best
but compares the use of progressive income taxes with progressive education subsidies.
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by Milton Friedman (1955), who envisioned repayment amounts to be proportional
to income, i.e. a linearly increasing repayment schedule. Several countries like
the United Kingdom, Australia or New Zealand currently have similar systems in
place, where repayment is proportional to income within a certain income range. In
this sense, our model develops a second-best argument for the use of such income-
contingent repayment rates. Importantly, to arrive at this conclusion, we do not im-
pose any restrictions on policy instruments in the spirit of the dynamic approach to
public finance. It is noteworthy that the implementation result itself is not necessar-
ily a case for Friedman’s proposal. In theory, repayment could also be decreasing in
income if college students are already over-insured (as compared to the second-best
optimal insurance) by the income tax; in such a case it would be optimal to lower
their effective marginal tax rates by having a decreasing repayment schedule. Look-
ing at real world income distributions, however, our Mirrleesian analysis yields the
opposite normative conclusion: a robust numerical result is that for low and inter-
mediate incomes, repayment should indeed be increasing in income.
In our analysis, we first concentrate on a general model, where the focus lies on the-
ory. We study an environment characterized by private information, which evolves
stochastically over time. Individuals are born with different innate abilities and de-
cide on their human capital investment. After obtaining education, agents learn their
skill level that can be interpreted as wage, they work and generate income. The plan-
ner cannot observe innate ability, work effort and the skill level (wage). However,
we do assume that the planner can observe educational investment. Labor market
risk is taken into account in our model by the fact that individuals face a distribution
of wages before entering the labor market. This distribution function depends on
acquired human capital and innate ability. When deriving analytical results, we try
to impose minimal structure on this stochastic process and work with a general dis-
tribution function. These modelling assumptions are quite flexible and in line with
empirical evidence as we argue in more detail when introducing the model.
As hinted at above, the optimal allocation features history-dependent laborwedges,
which is standard in dynamic models with informational frictions. We derive a sim-
ple formula for the optimal labor wedge that can be decomposed into two terms: one
that is equivalent to the seminal formulas of Mirrlees (1971) and Saez (2001) and one
that captures the optimal provision of dynamic incentives. We show that the dynamic
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incentive term has a very simple intuition, related to how responsive the distribution
of skills is to innate abilities.
Our theory also presents novel results on how individual education decisions are
distorted by government intervention in constrained Pareto optimal allocations. This
depends on two forces. First, implicit education subsidies are used to offset the
distortionary impact of labor taxes on educational decisions. Intuitively, the gains
from investing into education are partly reaped by the government via income taxes.
Therefore the government uses an education subsidy to internalize this fiscal exter-
nality. Second, the planner wants to tax education in case he wants to redistribute
from high to low innate ability types at the margin. This tax effect is increasing in the
complementarity between innate ability and education.
Next, we move on to suggesting ways how Pareto optima can be decentralized.
We show that the following policy instruments can implement the desired alloca-
tions: student loans with income-contingent repayment, a labor income tax schedule
that solely depends on income and a nonlinear savings tax. The labor wedge consists
of the marginal tax rate on labor income and the marginal loan repayment. The ed-
ucation wedge is implemented by the change in loan size as a function of education
and how the repayment schedule changes with the loan size. In addition, we provide
an alternative implementation with education-dependent income taxes similar to the
idea of a graduate tax which has been proposed in the popular debate in the United
Kingdom.
Finally, we move on from theory and present a simple application of the model,
featuring a binary education decision and only two different ex-ante types. Impor-
tantly, this enables us to use estimates of factual as well as counterfactual income
distributions from the labor economics literature (Cunha and Heckman 2007, 2008),
both of which are needed as an input to simulate optimal policies. We follow Saez
(2001) and append Pareto tails to the distributions of income before we calibrate the
skill distribution. Under the – we believe – reasonable assumption that the college
income distribution has thicker tails, the repayment schedule is increasing in income
for a Utilitarian planner. Importantly, this result is stronger than that, as it holds
along the Pareto frontier. Under the more conservative assumption that top incomes
are distributed according to the same Pareto parameter, the repayment schedule is
still increasing for low to intermediate incomes and roughly flat afterwards.
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We gauge the welfare gains relative to a situation where labor wedges are con-
strained to be a function of income only but the planner can otherwise fully optimize.
Concerning the policy instruments mentioned above, this is equivalent to restricting
loan repayment to be independent of income. The key simplifying assumption to
make this comparison tractable is the absence of income effects. We show that in this
case, constraining labor wedges to be a function of income only is equivalent to re-
stricting income to be a function of the wage only. Comparing the second best to this
solution, we findwelfare gains ranging from about 0.2% to 0.6% of lifetime consump-
tion andwe show how these gains change with risk-aversion and societal preferences
for redistribution. Our welfare comparison is also a methodological contribution be-
cause we are the first to use a first-order approach for the case where labor taxes are
constrained to depend on current income only and can therefore use a very fine type
space.
Related Literature. Several previous papers have studied problems of optimal
income taxation and their relation to education decisions. One strand of inquiry
has worked under the assumption of ex-ante homogeneity and risky human capital.
Da Costa and Maestri (2007) show that human capital should always be encouraged
in the second-best optimum. Anderberg (2009) emphasizes that the risk properties
of human capital are crucial for the question whether and how education should be
distorted relative to a first-best rule.2
In a static setting with heterogeneity but without uncertainty, Bovenberg and Jacobs
(2005) analyze how endogenous education alters the result of the Mirrleesian tax
problem and conclude that distortions on the education margin through income tax-
ation should be offset by education subsidies. Relatedly, Bohacek and Kapicka (2008)
study a dynamic model with certainty and obtain similar results.3
Our paper is connected to the NewDynamic Public Finance literature. Concerning
the characterization of Pareto optimal allocations, it is related to two recent contribu-
2Focusing on linear policy instruments Anderberg and Andersson (2003) as well as Jacobs, Schindler and
Yang (2012) also discuss the importance of the risk properties of human capital.
3Kapicka (2006) introduces non-observable endogenous human capital into a dynamic, non-stochastic Mir-
rlees model where taxes can only be conditioned on current income. He shows that marginal tax rates are
lowered due to the education margin. Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) consider observable and unobservable in-
vestment and provide an interesting discussion about different implications. Grochulski and Piskorski (2010)
focus on the implications of unobservable human capital investment for capital taxation in an ex-ante homo-
geneous agent setting with uncertainty. Relatedly, Shourideh (2012) studies optimal taxation of capital income
with heterogeneous agents and capital income shocks.
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tions that have analyzed optimal labor wedges in dynamic Mirrlees economies with-
out endogenous education but with productivity shocks in every period, which we
abstract from. Farhi andWerning (2012) characterize the evolution of the laborwedge
over time analytically and numerically in such an environment. Golosov, Troshkin
and Tsyvinski (2011) derive and illustrate optimal labor wedges in the cross section,
connecting their generalized formulas to the static Mirrlees-Saez expressions.
Concerning the implementation of history-dependent allocations, our paper is re-
lated to Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) who consider an environment with absorbing
disability shocks and present an implementation in which disability insurance condi-
tions on asset testing.4 Similar as Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006), we analyze a model
with a relatively simple stochastic environment, which enables us to present decen-
tralizations of Pareto optima with simple policy instruments. Further, our imple-
mentation builds on recent work of Werning (2011), who shows that decentralized
implementations of incentive compatible allocations exist, which are characterized
by non-linear capital taxes that do not condition on current income and can even be
history-independent.
The dependency of the tax schedules on characteristics other than income is related
to the idea of tagging, as proposed by Akerlof (1978).5 Whereas our analysis shares
the feature of this method in that the social planner uses additional information to
tailor marginal tax rates for each education level to the respective skill distribution,
it differs substantially in the sense that education is not an immutable tag, but rather
an endogenous variable.6
Finally, the paper is related to Luttmer and Zeckhauser (2008), who consider a set-
ting in which agents have some form of private information about a distribution of
outcomes. They apply this idea numerically to the case of income risk and two ex-
ante types who self-select into two different tax schedules based on a private signal
about their ability. For this purpose the authors interpret the college entry decision
as a proxy for this private signal. In contrast, in our model the distribution of labor
4Kocherlakota (2005) provides an implementation based on income-contingent wealth taxes in a very gen-
eral stochastic environment. Albanesi and Sleet (2006) derive an implementation with wealth-contingent in-
come taxes for the case of iid shocks.
5More recently tagging is investigated by Cremer, Gahvari and Lozachmeur (2010), Mankiw andWeinzierl
(2010) as well as Weinzierl (2011b).
6A similar logic arises in the recent paper of Scheuer (2012) in a model with endogenous occupational
choices.
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market skills depends on innate ability and education jointly and importantly, the
education decision of individuals is endogenous.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basics of the model.
In Section 3, we investigate dynamic incentive compatibility and describe the ma-
jor properties of constrained efficient allocations. Decentralized implementations of
constrained efficient allocations are provided in Section 4. We apply our model to the
case of a binary education decision in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Technology and Preferences
Individuals, whose mass is normalized to one, live for two periods. In the first period
they acquire human capital and in the second period they work. Individual labor
market ability in period two is stochastic and the distribution depends on educational
investment and initial type. We now formalize these ideas.
Individuals differ in innate ability θ, which can be interpreted as a one dimensional
aggregate of (non-)cognitive skills, I.Q. and family background, and is distributed
in the interval [θ, θ] according to the cumulative density function (cdf) F (θ). After
individuals learn their type θ, which is private information, theymake an educational
investment z. Flow utility in period 1 is assumed to be u(c1), so we abstract from any
effort costs of education.
In period two individuals draw their labor market ability a from a continuous
conditional cdf G(a|z, θ), which depends on innate ability θ and education z and has
bounded support [a, a]. When individuals learn their type a, theymake a labor-leisure
decision. We assume that preferences in period 2 are given by:7u(c2)−Ψ
(
y
a
)
.
With this specification of the model, we capture many empirical regularities. First,
assuming G(a|z, θ) to be non-degenerate, our model captures the important fact of
uncertainty in the labor market and risky educational investment. See e.g. Cunha
and Heckman (2008) or Chen (2008) for recent contributions.
7We stick to separable preferences in the analytic part because the formula for the optimal labor wedge
will be very easy to interpret. For the numerical simulations in Section 5, we sometimes depart from the
separability assumption.
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Second, we allow this cdf to be a function of innate ability θ and thereby capture
the fact that inequality in earnings is – to a certain extent – also determined by innate
ability. Taber (2001) presents findings suggesting that much of the rise in the college
premium may be attributed to a rise in the demand for unobserved skills, which are
predetermined and independent of education. Indirect evidence for the importance
of unobserved skills comes from the strong persistence of within education group
inequality (Acemoglu and Autor 2011).
Third, the cdf G being a function of z captures the returns to education. Impor-
tantly, for most of our results, we do not impose a certain assumption on the pattern
of these returns. Thus, our framework can either capture risk-increasing or risk-
decreasing human capital investment.
Fourth, as long as ∂
2G(a|z,θ)
∂θ∂z 6= 0, returns to educational investment differ in innate
ability θ. E.g., Carneiro and Heckman (2005) document that the returns can differ by
as much as 19% points across individuals for one year of college. See also Lemieux
(2006) for evidence on heterogeneity in returns.
To sharpen a few analytical results, it turns out helpful to place some structure on
the behavior of G(a|z, θ):
Assumption 1: G(a|z′, θ) FOSD G(a|z, θ) ⇔ G(a|z′, θ) ≤ G(a|z, θ), for all z < z′ and for
all (θ, a).
Assumption 2: G(a|z, θ′) FOSD G(a|z, θ) ⇔ G(a|z, θ′) ≤ G(a|z, θ), for all θ < θ′ and for
all (z, a).
Assumption 3: ∂
2G(a|z,θ)
∂θ∂z ≤ 0 for all θ, z.
These assumption will not be needed to derive our main results, but help to illus-
trate important aspects of the model. Whenever an assumption is needed for a result,
we refer to it. The first and the second one capture the notion that education and in-
nate ability should both have a direct effect on labor market outcomes represented
by a first-order stochastic dominance shift; a rather natural way of ordering distribu-
tions. The third one captures their interaction and respects the compelling evidence
of complementarity between early ability and educational investment.
When simulating optimal policies, we take into account that the education period
is shorter than the working period and then consider Te identical education periods
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and Tw identical working periods. Hence, we basically just multiply period one by
Te and period two by Tw. This also implies that we abstract from further shocks to
idiosyncratic labor productivity. This simplifies and helps to focus the analysis on the
education-taxation link. In the empirical literature, there is no ultimate consensus
on the relative importance of heterogeneity before labor market entry for lifetime
inequality, but different approaches have attributed a major role to it. In recent work,
Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2011) estimate a structural life-cyclemodel and find that
differences realized at the age of 23 can account for more of the variation in lifetime
outcomes than do shocks received over the working lifetime. A standard reference is
Kean and Wolpin (1997), who attribute an astonishing 90% to heterogeneity realized
before labor market entry, while Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004) estimate a
number of about 50%.
2.2 The Laissez Faire Equilibrium
To lay out the basic properties of the model, we start with the characterization of
the laissez-faire equilibrium without government intervention. In the second period,
after agents have learned their labor market skill a, they choose labor supply, taking
savings or private debt as given. This gives rise to the indirect utility function:
v2(a, s(θ)) = max
y,c2
u (c2)−Ψ
(
y
a
)
s.t. c2 = y +Rs(θ).
Individuals’ utility functions are well-behaved – u(.) is assumed to be increasing, at
least twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave, and Ψ(.) to be increasing,
at least twice continuously differentiable and strictly convex. The parameter a is an
individual’s labor market skill, meaning that individuals with a higher a need to
provide less labor effort to earn a given income y.
In the first period, agents decide how much to invest in education, and make a
consumption-saving decision. Agents have access to a risk-free one period bond
market; we impose no short-sale or enforcement constraints and an exogenous gross
return R. This defines the indirect utility function:
V (θ) = max
s,z,c1
u(c1) + β
∫ a
a
v2(a, s)g(a|z, θ)da s.t. c1 + z = −s,
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where s are savings. As already stated in the last section, we model the conditional
distribution of skills g(a|z, θ) as being determined by an agent’s education level z
and her innate ability θ. Moreover, we focus on educational investment as a direct
monetary cost. This is consistent with the idea that tuition fees and other monetary
expenses are the most important factors on the cost side driving educational deci-
sions. It is also in line with a foregone earnings interpretation, where more education
delays labor market entry. z can be a sum of both factors.
We now present the main properties of the equilibrium without government inter-
vention:
Proposition 2.1. The laissez-faire allocation has the following properties:
(i) The Euler Equation holds:
u′(c1(θ)) = βR
∫ a
a
u′(c2(θ, a))dG(a|z(θ), θ)
(ii) Labor supply is undistorted: Ψ′
(
y(θ,a)
a
)
1
a = u
′(c2(θ)).
(iii) The marginal cost of education is equalized to marginal benefits:
u′(c1(θ)) = β
∫ a
a
v2(θ, a)
∂g(a|z(θ),θ)
∂z da
(iv) If Assumptions 1-3 hold, educational investment is increasing and savings are decreasing
in innate ability, i.e. z′(θ) > 0 and s′(θ) < 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.1
Parts (i)-(iii) follow directly from the first-order conditions. They are unsurprising
properties, stating that private marginal rates of substitution are equated to technical
marginal rates of transformation on the labor, capital, and education market.
Part (iv) states that without government policies, education and savings are mono-
tone in innate ability θ if Assumptions 1-3 are fulfilled. The proof provides instructive
intuition for this result. It is sufficient to show that the objective is supermodular in all
choice variables and type θ (see Milgrom and Shannon (1994)). Inserting the budget
constraint gives the problem reduced to two choices s and z: maxs,z U(s, z; θ, a, β) =
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u(−s − z) + β
∫ a
a
v2(a, s)g(a|z, θ)da. This objective is supermodular in credit taken −s,
education z and type if and only if:
∂2U(s, z; θ, .)
∂s∂θ
< 0 (1)
∂2U(s, z; θ, .)
∂s∂z
< 0 (2)
∂2U(s, z; θ, .)
∂z∂θ
> 0. (3)
In Appendix A.1 we show that all inequalities hold. Equations (1) and (2) imply that
the return to savings is lower for higher θ types and with higher education, since
expected labor skills are also higher. Equation (3) holds, since innate abilities and ed-
ucation are complementary to each other. Taken together the direct effects of being of
higher type on credit and education are being reinforced by the relationship between
the endogenous variables.
So far, we have assumed no limits on the ability of agents to borrow against future
labor income. Imposing an ad hoc constraint of the form s ≥ φ, where φ is some
negative number, leaves most of the results from Proposition 2.1 unaffected. Notably,
constrained agents will not be able to smooth consumption intertemporally as much
as desired. Still education levels will be increasing in type:
Corollary 2.2. Suppose Assumptions 1,2 and 3 hold. If agents face borrowing constraints
s ≥ φ, education is monotone in type θ, i.e. z′(θ) > 0 in the laissez-faire equilibrium.
Proof. Above some threshold type, agents reach the borrowing limit and set s equal
to φ. Of those agents higher types still face the greater returns to education because
of the complementarity and therefore choose a higher level of z.
The empirical literature has documented sorting into education, based on hetero-
geneous expected returns (Cunha and Heckman 2007). The monotonicity of educa-
tion in the laissez-faire equilibrium is consistent with that fact.
2.3 Wedges
For later purposes when we analyze optimal allocations and the respective tax and
education finance systems that can implement such allocations, it is useful to define
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three wedges. They are equal to implicit marginal tax rates on savings, labor income
and education, respectively:
Savings wedge:
τs(θ) = 1−
u′(c1(θ))
βR
∫ a
a
u′(c2(θ, a))g(a|z, θ)da
where R is the gross return on savings. τs(θ) > (<)0 implies a downward (upward)
distortion of savings.
Labor wedge: The labor wedge is positive (negative) if an individual works less
(more) than it would at the intervention-free market price (which is her productivity
level a). Formally the labor wedge reads as:
τy(θ, a) = 1−
Ψ′
(
y(θ,a)
a
)
1
a
u′(c2(θ, a))
.
Educationwedge: Here a positive (negative) wedge corresponds to an upward (down-
ward) distortion of the education decision. Formally the education wedge reads as
τz(θ) = 1−
β
∫ a
a
v2(θ, a)
∂g(a|z(θ),θ)
∂z(θ)
da
u′(c1(θ))
.
3 Constrained Pareto Optimal Allocations
In this section, we characterize constrained Pareto efficient allocations, where ’con-
strained’ refers to the government being unable to observe agents’ type θ in period
one and a in period two. In Subsection 3.1, we show that the problem is tractable
using a first-order approach. In addition, we provide necessary as well as sufficient
conditions for this approach to be valid. In Subsection 3.2, we analyze optimality
conditions and their consequences for optimal policies. In Subsection 3.3, we explore
the model using numerical simulations.
3.1 Incentive Compatibility
We cast the problem as a sequential, dynamic mechanism – agents report an initial
type θ in the first period and, after uncertainty has materialized, report their produc-
tivity a in the second period. The planner assigns initial consumption levels c1(θ) and
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education levels z(θ) to individuals with innate ability θ. Moreover, with each report
there comes a sequence of utility promises for the next period {v2(θ, a)}a∈[a,a]. In the
second period, the screening takes place over consumption levels c2(θ, a) and labor
supply y(θ, a). All these quantities define an allocation in the economy. Dynamic in-
centive compatibility is ensured backwards, so we start analyzing the problem from
the second period.
3.1.1 Second Period Incentive Compatibility
By the revelation principle, we can restrict attention to direct mechanisms. Suppose
that in the first period agents have made truthful reports rθ(θ) = θ, although this is
not necessary and just simplifies the exposition.8 Conditions for this to be true are
given in the next subsection. Conditional on this report, the second period incentive
constraint must be met for any history of types (θ, a) and reporting strategy ra(a):
u (c2 (θ, a))−Ψ
[
y(θ, a)
a
]
≥ u (c2 (θ, ra(a)))−Ψ
[
y(θ, ra(a))
a
]
∀a, ra(a), θ.
Define the associated indirect utility function of the agents as:
v2(θ, a) = max
ra(a)
u (c2 (θ, ra(a)))−Ψ
[
y(θ, ra(a))
a
]
.
Like in a standard Mirrleesian problem preferences satisfy single-crossing for given
first-period reports. For global incentive compatibility it is, hence, necessary and
sufficient that all local envelope conditions hold:
∂v2(θ, a)
∂a
= Ψ′
(
y(θ, a)
a
)
y(θ, a)
a2
, (4)
and the usual monotonicity condition, stating that y(θ, a) is non-decreasing in ability
levels a, is satisfied:
∂y(θ, a)
∂a
≥ 0. (5)
8The reason is that in the second period the utility is a function of a, ra(a) and rθ(θ) but not of θ.
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3.1.2 First Period Incentive Compatibility
In the first period, an agent takes into account the effect of her report about θ on
future utility. First period incentive compatibility is ensured if and only if the double
continuum of weak inequalities holds:
U(θ, θ) = u (c1 (θ)) + β
∫ a
a
v2(θ, a)dG(a|z(θ), θ) ≥
u (c1 (rθ(θ))) + β
∫ a
a
v2(rθ(θ), a)dG(a|z(rθ(θ)), θ) = U(θ, rθ(θ)), ∀θ, rθ(θ),
where U(θ, rθ(θ)) is the expected utility of an individual of type θ reporting rθ(θ). The
associated value function is:
V (θ) = max
rθ(θ)
u (c1 (rθ(θ))) + β
∫ a
a
v2(rθ(θ), a)dG(a|z(rθ(θ)), θ). (6)
By using the FOC of (6) one can easily derive the following envelope condition
dV (θ)
dθ
= β
∫ a
a
v2(θ, a)
∂g(a|z(θ), θ)
∂θ
da, (7)
which can easily be incorporated into a Lagrangian. As often done in screening
problems, our strategy for solving the second-best problem is to work with a re-
laxed problem with only restrictions (4) and (7) being imposed and then check ex-
post whether incentive compatibility is fulfilled. In the numerical explorations in
Section 3.3 we find that incentive compatibility is always satisfied and therefore the
first-order approach is valid for the primitives we consider.9
Next, we present a set of sufficient conditions.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose Assumptions 2 and 3 hold, conditions (4), (5), (7) are satisfied and we
have:
(i)
∂y(θ,a)
∂θ > 0,
9Our results of this section on dynamic incentive compatibility are related to previous work in the optimal
non-linear pricing literature by Courty and Li (2000). They study optimal pricing schemes of a monopolist
facing consumers with stochastic tastes. In our case the distribution of types tomorrow is endogenous since
education is a choice. In recent contributions, Kapicka (2011) as well as Pavan, Segal and Toikka (2011) inves-
tigate the robustness and validity of the Mirrleesian first-order approach in a large class of general dynamic
environments.
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(ii)
∂z(θ)
∂θ > 0,
then the considered allocation is incentive compatible.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
This lemma implies that instead of directly ex-post verifying whether period one
incentive compatibility is satisfied in an allocation, one can alternatively check these
two simple monotonicity conditions; if they are fulfilled, then the allocation is incen-
tive compatible. Whereas condition (ii) is always fulfilled in our numerical examples,
condition (i) was often violated for very low a; we will comment on the reasons in
Section 3.3 when we present numerical illustrations of the model.
3.2 Properties of Constrained Pareto Optimal Allocations
The planner maximizes
∫ θ
θ
u(c1(θ))dF˜ (θ) + β
∫ θ
θ
∫ a
a
v2(θ, a)dG(a|z(θ), θ)dF˜ (θ)
subject to (4), (7) and the resource constraint:
∫ θ
θ
[
c1(θ)− z(θ) +
1
R
∫ a
a
(c2(θ, a)− y(θ, a))dG(a|z(θ), θ)
]
dF (θ) = 0.
We let the planner assign Pareto weights F˜ (θ) to individuals, depending (solely) on
their initial skill level. Any distribution of these weights, which we normalize to sat-
isfy
∫ θ
θ
f˜(θ)dθ = 1, corresponds to one point on the Pareto frontier. λR denotes themul-
tipliers on the resource constraint and η(θ) the multiplier function of the first-period
envelope conditions. In Appendix A.3 the Lagrangian and the first-order conditions
of the problem are stated.10 We now characterize the wedges of second-best Pareto
optimal allocations.
10As with the localization of the incentive constraints, we verify numerically that our solution fulfilling the
first-order conditions indeed attains the maximum.
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3.2.1 Labor Distortions
The following proposition characterizes the optimal labor wedge.11
Proposition 3.2. At any constrained Pareto optimum, labor wedges satisfy:
τy(θ, a)
1− τy(θ, a)
=
1 + εu(θ, a)
εc(θ, a)
u′(c2(θ, a))
ag(a|z(θ), θ)
[A(θ, a) + B(θ, a)] ,
where
A(θ, a) =G(a|z(θ), θ)
[∫ a
a
1
u′(c2(θ, a∗))
dG(a∗|z(θ), θ)
−
1−G(a|z(θ)
G(a|z(θ), θ)
∫ a
a
1
u′(c2(θ, a∗))
dG(a∗|z(θ), θ)
]
B(θ, a) =
1
f(θ)λR
Rβ
∂ [1−G(a|z(θ), θ)]
∂θ
η(θ),
where εu(θ, a) (εc(θ, a)) is the uncompensated (compensated) labor supply elasticity of type
(θ, a) and
η(θ) = F˜ (θ)−
∫ θ
θ
1
u′(c1(θ))
f(θ)dθ∫ θ
θ
1
u′(c1(θ))
f(θ)dθ
.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.2.
Elasticities play a double role for the optimal labor wedge. On the one hand, a
higher compensated elasticity increases the excess burden of labor distortions and is
therefore inversely related to optimal labor wedges; on the other hand, a higher un-
compensated elasticity translates into higher income inequality for a given skill distri-
bution, making insurance more valuable and therefore tends to increase optimal la-
bor wedges. Moreover, the weighted mass ag(a|z(θ), θ) of agents whose labor supply
is distorted by the tax is negatively related to themarginal tax reflecting a deadweight
loss argument. The term u′(c2(θ, a)) can be interpreted as capturing income effects –
11In a recent paper Golosov, Troshkin and Tsyvinski (2011) provide formulas for dynamic optimal labor
wedges with exogenous human capital, connecting them to empirical observables in the spirit of the contribu-
tions of Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) for the static Mirrlees model.
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for individuals with low consumption income effects are stronger and therefore the
disincentive effect of marginal tax rates is weakened.
Conceptually, the labor wedge consists of two parts in our dynamic economy. The
first one, A(θ, a), is a variation of the optimal tax formula in the static Mirrlees case,
with the difference that for each initial type θ there is one separate function A(θ, · ).
A(θ, a) disappears if agents are risk neutral and therefore second period insurance
is not a concern. With risk-aversion, however, optimal policies provide insurance
against the labor market risk agents face. Education enters through its effect on the
conditional distribution of skills. The term is equivalent to the tax formula from the
standard static Mirrlees problem with utilitarian welfare weights and, as shown in
Appendix A.4.2, it can be rewritten as in Saez (2001).
The second term B(θ, a) is novel and shows how labor tax rates are used to op-
timally supply dynamic incentives. In contrast to A(θ, a), it is independent of risk-
preferences, but vanishes with ex-ante homogeneous agents. Fixing a, the implicit
tax rate is proportional to ∂[1−G(a|z(θ),θ)]∂θ , which measures the change in the probability
of becoming a higher type than a. Higher initial types have, education constant, a
higher probability of reaching a skill level above a. For two neighboring θ the plan-
ner adjusts the labor wedges of the lower type to deter a deviation in the first period.
The increase in the implicit marginal tax rate increases average taxes for all skills
a∗ ≥ a and makes mimicking unattractive for the higher type. The effect is bigger,
the more important the effect of innate abilities on labor market outcomes. The term
also increases in η(θ) which captures the redistributive preferences of the planner at
the margin. Note that this term can also be negative, especially if Pareto weights are
in favor of high θ-types. Finally, a no-distortion at the top and bottom result goes
through since B(θ, a) = B(θ, a) = A(θ, a) = A(θ, a) = 0.
3.2.2 Education Distortions
The following proposition characterizes optimal education policies.
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Proposition 3.3. At any constrained Pareto optimum, the education wedge is given by:
τz(θ) =
1
R
∫ a
a
(y(θ, a)− c2(θ, a))
∂g(a|z(θ), θ)
∂z(θ)
da
+
βη(θ)
λRf(θ)
∫ a
a
∂v2(θ, a)
∂a
∂2G(a|z(θ), θ)
∂z(θ)∂θ
da.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.3.
The first term captures the expected marginal fiscal gain of an increase in educa-
tion. One can show that it is always positive under Assumption 1 (FOSD shift of ed-
ucation) and positive labor wedges. Investing a dollar more into education increases
the expected obligation of an agent. The first part of the education wedge exactly off-
sets this effect from the labor wedge. Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) have discovered
this effect for the static Mirrlees model, whereas we show this fiscal externality part
of the wedge extends to the setting with uncertainty, holding in expectation.
We now turn to the second term. Under Assumption 3 the cross-derivative ∂
2G(a|z(θ),θ)
∂z(θ)∂θ
is negative and ∂v2(θ,a)∂a is positive everywhere by second-period incentive compatibil-
ity. Further, for redistributive preferences η(θ) is typically positive. Then the second
part of the education wedge is negative and acts as an implicit tax on education. By
distorting education downward, the planner relaxes binding incentive constraints
and can redistribute more effectively in line with her preferences. This is a conse-
quence of the complementarity assumption, stating that agents endowedwith higher
innate skills gain more from education at the margin. The bundle of a lower type,
hence, becomes less attractive from the perspective of an agent if education is down-
ward distorted. Such an intuition is familiar from the standard static Mirrlees model
concerning positive marginal income tax rates on the interior of the skill set. Relat-
edly, for this incentive term a zero at the top and at the bottom (θ, θ) result holds.12
12Jacobs and Bovenberg (2011) discuss deviations from a first-best rule for the education subsidy for a gen-
eral earnings function in the case without uncertainty. Our result is similar to their first result that a comple-
mentarity in education and ability leads to a tax on education. They also consider the degree of complemen-
tarity between labor supply and education which might call for an education subsidy in contrast. This second
effect is not captured in our environment since the returns to labor supply – once uncertainty has materialized
– are independent from the education choice.
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3.2.3 Savings Distortions
It turns out that the presence of education, which endogenously affects the probabil-
ity distribution of tomorrow’s skills, does not change the prescription of a positive
intertemporal wedge, stemming from the optimality of the Inverse Euler equation
in dynamic Mirrleesian models.13 Some manipulations of the first-order conditions
yield the following proposition:
Proposition 3.4. In any constrained Pareto optimum, the inverse Euler equation holds:
1
u′(c1(θ))
=
1
βR
∫ a
a
1
u′(c2(θ, a))
g(a|z(θ), θ)da =
1
βR
Ea|θ
[
1
u′(c2(θ, a))
]
.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.1.
Jensen’s inequality then implies βE [u′(c2(θ, a))] > u′(c1(θ)) – the optimal allocation
dictates a wedge between the intertemporal rate of substitution and transformation;
savings are discouraged.
3.2.4 Multiple Education and Working Periods
We have worked with a two-period life-cycle model so far. We now briefly show
how our results for optimal allocations can easily be extended to the case of multiple
education andworking life periods. For our numerical simulations, this enables us to
account for the fact that the time spent in (tertiary) education relative to the working
life is small.
Let Te be the number of years education takes place and Tw the number of years an
individual works, such that Tw + Te = T . During education, so for the first Te years
in the life-cycle, consumption is constant and given by ce(θ), consumption during the
work period, cw(θ, a) and income earned yw(θ, a) are also constant, as can be shown
under our assumption of separable preferences.
However, whereas there is no intertemporal wedge within the years of education
and within one’s working life, the inverse Euler equation still governs the relation-
ship between ce(θ) and cw(θ, a) generating the familiar savings distortion. Assuming
13 Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) and Rogerson (1985) were the first to derive it. In an important paper
reviving the interest in the result, Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003) generalized it to a large class of
dynamic environments, most importantly allowing for arbitrary skill processes.
19
βR = 1, the laborwedges are given by the analogous expressions as in Proposition 3.4.
Also the education wedge remains unaffected, except that the expression is adjusted
for the time-horizon since the marginal benefits and incentive costs of education de-
pend on the length of the working life period:
τz(θ) =
T∑
t=Te+1
βt−1
∫ a
a
(yw(θ, a)− cwθ, a))
∂g(a|z(θ), θ)
∂z(θ)
da
+
∑T
t=Te+1
βt−1η(θ)
λRf(θ)
∫ a
a
∂v2(θ, a)
∂a
∂2G(a|z(θ), θ)
∂z(θ)∂θ
da,
with βR = 1.
3.3 Numerical Illustration
In this section we numerically explore our model in an illustrative manner. We con-
sider two skill distributions as our primitives G(a|z, θ) that lead to very similar equi-
libriumwage distributions and educational expenses for actual given policies. In one
of the cases, the distribution function is characterized by a strong complementarity
between innate skills and education. In the other, there is less complementarity and
the direct effects of education and innate skills dominate.
We solve for the Utilitarian optimum, so f˜(θ) = f(θ) ∀ θ. The utility function is:
U(c, l) =
c1−ρ
1− ρ
−
(y/a)σ
σ
,
where we set σ = 3, implying a Frisch elasticity of 0.5 and the CRRA coefficient to
ρ = 2. The yearly risk-free rate is assumed to be 3% (R=1.03) and β = 1/R.
We assume that labor market abilities are distributed log-normally following com-
mon practice and impose the location parameter µ to be a function of θ and z. Con-
cerning θ, we assume a uniform distribution within [0.1, 1].
Case (a) - Strong Complementarity: The functional form of the location parameter
is:
µ(θ, z) = 1.7 + 1.5θ0.5z0.15.
In this case, individuals are the same if they do not acquire any education at all.
However, the more education they acquire the stronger are the differences in the
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location parameters. This inequality in µ will be reinforced by the fact that agents
have incentives to self-select into different education levels because of heterogeneous
returns.
Case (b) - Strong Direct Effect: In the second case we assume,
µ(θ, z) = 1.5 + θ + 0.75z0.25.
In this case, individuals are already very different from the outset, i.e. if nobody ac-
quires any education. The difference in the location parameter then stays constant for
an uniform increase in z across agents. Although ∂
2µ(θ,z)
∂θ∂z = 0 in this case, Assumption
3 is fulfilled for the relevant range. However, innate skills and education are weaker
complements as compared to Case (a).
The respective parameters for the two cases as well as the respective constant
marginal costs of education were chosen such that with an approximation of the cur-
rent tax and college subsidy system in the US, themodel roughly replicates per-capita
expenditures on college education and the centers of the interval of the location pa-
rameters of the log-normal distributions is equal to the empirical value of the wage
distribution.14
Figure 1 illustrates optimal education wedges for the two cases. In both cases, the
optimal allocation features positive implicit education subsidies around 40%, which
are relatively flat across innate types. The main difference between the two cases
lies in the incentive effect. When innate skills and education are complements, the
planner finds it optimal to tax education relative to a first best in line with Proposition
3.3. In Case (a) this incentive effect becomes as large as 17% whereas in Case (b) it
hovers around zero.
Figure 2 illustrates the optimal labor wedges from Proposition 3.2. Panel (a) dis-
plays the optimal labor wedge as a function of income.15 Darker regions refer to
14Following Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante (2011) we set the labor income tax to a flat rate of 27% and a
lump sum transfer of one sixth of labor income per capita. We introduce a yearly education subsidy of 24%.
In both cases, for these given policy instruments, average college education expenditures per year are roughly
30% of yearlymedian income; a long run average for the US (Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante 2011). The realized
values of µ(θ, z) are within the range [2.02, 3.34], centered around 2.76, the value of the lognormal fit for the US
wage distribution found by Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan (2009); as them, we set the scale parameter equal to
0.565.
15To economize on space we only show the figures for Case (b) here. The graphs for Case (a) turn out to
look nearly identical.
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Figure 2: Optimal Labor Wedges
innate low types and lighter regions to innate high types. The picture shows that
higher innate types face high labor wedges, wheres the shape of the wedges does not
vary with θ.16 In the next panel (b), we illustrate the decomposition from Proposi-
tion 3.2 into the insurance term and the incentive term by plotting A(θ, a) and B(θ, a).
The set of insurance effects A(θ, a) lies above the set of incentive effects B(θ, a). Still,
especially at the beginning of the income distribution incentive effects contribute to
higher implicit tax rates. The graphs also reveals that these incentive effects are of
more importance for higher innate types on average.
16Since low incomes the distortions are strongly increasing in θ, condition (i) of Lemma 3.1 is typically not
fulfilled for low a.
22
4 Implementation
So far we only considered a direct mechanism, in which individuals make reports
about their realized type and the planner assigns bundles of consumption, labor sup-
ply and education as functions of the reports. The focus in the characterization of
the optimal allocation was on wedges or implicit price distortions of the allocation.
In this section, we explore two decentralized implementations of constrained Pareto
optima.
4.1 Implementation One: Student Grants and Income Taxes Condition-
ing on Education
4.1.1 Two Periods
The benevolent government offers a menu of student grants to the agents. These
grants G are conditional on education. In the second period, there is a tax schedule
in place, which, importantly, does not only condition on earnings but also on edu-
cational investment. Further, savings taxes are high enough to make private savings
disappear from themarket; the definition of the savings tax builds onWerning (2011).
We summarize this in the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1. Any constrained Pareto optimal allocation in a two period economy can
be implemented by a grant schedule G(z), an education dependent income tax T (y, z) and a
savings tax T s(s), where
• G(z(θ)) = z(θ) + c1(θ)
• T (y(θ, a), z(θ)) = y(θ, a)− c2(θ, a)
• T s(s) as defined in Appendix A.5.
Proof. See Appendix A.5
Implementation of savings wedges: The savings function T s(s) is prohibitively
high such that all agents choose s = 0, hence in this implementation there are no pri-
vate savings. However, as shown inWerning (2011) this comes without loss of gener-
ality: by a Ricardian equivalence argument, we can adjust G(z(θ)) and T (y(θ, a), z(θ))
with lump-sum transfers and deductibles to arrive with a non-linear savings tax
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schedule, which produces non-zero private savings for every agent and the same al-
location with the same distortion of consumption across periods. The full argument
is found in Werning (2011).
Implementation of labor wedges: Agents enter the second period with no savings
as argued above. Their budget constraint is then: T (y(θ, a), z(θ)) = y(θ, a) − c2(θ, a).
From the agents’ optimality conditions for y and c2 it follows that marginal tax rates
Ty(y(θ, a), z(θ)) are equal to labor wedges τy(θ, a) as characterized in Section 3.2.1.
Implementation of education wedges: To fix ideas, the budget constraints of an
agent in both periods are given by:
c1(θ) + z(θ) ≤ G(z(θ))
c2(θ, a) ≤ y(θ, a)− T (z(θ), y(θ, a)),
where we already imposed the zero savings. In contrast to the optimal labor wedge,
which equals the optimal labor tax, there is no single policy instrument for which the
education wedge equals the marginal distortion of the policy. Instead, the govern-
ment uses two instruments: i) the non-linear grant schedule G(z), which depends on
education chosen and ii) the labor tax code in the second period. Using the agents’
optimality conditions in the proposed implementation one can show that the wedge
equals:
τz(θ) = G
′(z)−
∫ a
a
u′(c2(θ, a))
u′(c1(θ))
g(a|z(θ), θ)Tz(y(θ, a), z(θ))da
A positive value of τz(θ) encourages education at level θ. The incentive for agents
to increase their educational attainment comes from: i) An increase in their grant
measured by G′(z)17 and ii) an increase or decrease in their labor income tax burden
for all states, i.e. Tz(y(θ, a), z(θ)).
4.1.2 T Periods
The possible extension to the life-cycle case is summarized as follows:
17Theoretically it could be the case that G is (partly) decreasing in z if c1(θ) is sufficiently decreasing. How-
ever, this is rather unlikely and in all our numerical examples we have c′
1
(θ) > 0.
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Corollary 4.2. Any constrained Pareto optimal allocation in a T-period economy can be im-
plemented by a grant schedule G(z), an education dependent income tax Tt(yt, z) that condi-
tions on the history of incomes and a savings tax T s(s).
Proof. See Appendix A.6
The corollary is an application of insights from Werning (2007), who characterizes
possible implementations in the dynamic deterministic Mirrlees problem. The prob-
lem here is similar to his model with the only difference that there is not only one tax
schedule conditioning on the history of incomes yt, but rather one for each θ-type or
each education level z.
One might wonder why the optimum is not simply implementable with history-
independent schedules. The reason is that with such a tax system it might be possible
for an individual to profit from tax arbitrage if tax schedules are sufficiently concave.
Instead of earning the assigned income y every period, it can, e.g., then be favorable
for an individual to earn y−ǫ today and y+ǫ tomorrow. Average gross income would
be the same, however, due to concavity of T (y) the tax burden would decrease; if
this effect is strong enough, it might compensate for the higher disutility of labor. In
reality such strategic behavior to exploit the non-linearity of the tax system seems
unlikely to occur. One reason is that shifting labor income between periods in such
a way is often very costly or simply infeasible due to adjustment costs and hours
restrictions.18 Formally, let C˜(y∗) denote the present value of total adjustment costs
of an individual that chooses income history y∗, and if y∗Te+1 = y
∗
Te+2
= ... = y∗T , then
C˜(y∗) = 0, so if labor supply is constant, there are no adjustment costs.
Definition For a given adjustment cost function C˜(·), an income tax schedule T (y, z)
is tax arbitrage resistant if V (y∗, c∗(y∗, T (y, z(θ)), C˜(y∗)) ≤ V (ytruth(θ, a), ctruth(θ, a)) ∀ y∗
and ∀ (θ, a), where c∗(y∗, T (y), C˜(y∗)) is the optimal consumption sequence given y∗,
T (y) and V (·, ·) is the respective (deterministic) working life utility conditional on the
realization of a.
With this in mind, we make the following assumption stating that strategic devia-
tions are never feasible for a worker because of adjustment costs:
18For a recent treatment of hours constraint in the public economics literature see Chetty, Friedman, Olsen
and Pistaferri (2011); for the implications of adjustment costs on hours choices and the labor supply elasticity
see Chetty (2012). In addition to adjustment costs, there are also reasons outside our model, which make
sophisticated intertemporal deviations unlikely, for example, idiosyncratic or aggregate uncertainty, imperfect
credit markets or bounded rationality.
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Assumption 4: The adjustment cost function C˜(·) is such that the income tax sched-
ules T (y, z) with T (y(θ, a), z(θ)) = y(θ, a)− cw(θ, a) are tax arbitrage resistant.
This allows to implement constrained efficient allocations using a labor tax system
that conditions on current income and one’s education level only.19 We summarize
this in the following corollary:
Corollary 4.3. Assume that Assumption 4 holds. Then any constrained Pareto optimal al-
location in a T-period economy can be implemented by a grant schedule G(z), an education
dependent income tax T (y, z) with T (y(θ, a), z(θ)) = y(θ, a)−cw(θ, a) and a savings tax T s(s).
Proof. By Assumption 4 we know that individuals prefer yT (θ, a) over any income
sequence where y is not constant over time. By incentive compatibility we know that
each individual prefers yT (θ, a) over yT (θ, a′) ∀ a′, a; combining this with the insights
of Proposition 4.1 yields the result.
4.2 Implementation Two: Student Loans with Income-Contingent Re-
payment
4.2.1 Two Periods
The previous implementation required that people with the same income but differ-
ent levels of education pay different taxes. In reality people might perceive this as
a violation of horizontal equity concerns, which could hinder the political feasibility
of such policies. In this light we now present a more appealing alternative imple-
mentation with only one labor income tax schedule and a repayment scheme of the
education grant.20 Technically, this can be seen as a simple reinterpretation of the pre-
vious implementation – we take the tax system of the θ as the common labor income
tax schedule and introduce an income-contingent repayment schedule, which condi-
tions on the size of the loan.21 Together both instruments are sufficient to replicate
the optimal labor wedges. Formally we summarize this in the following proposition:
19We admit that this assumption might be considered as ad hoc. At the same time, the policy conclusions
of any static nonlinear tax problem also share the problem of arbitrage opportunities once applied to (the
dynamic) reality. Whereas arbitrage opportunities seem to be empirically important for capital income, we
conjecture that making use of such arbitrage opportunities is of second-order importance for labor income.
20Diamond and Saez (2011) argue in a recent contribution that practical policy prescription from optimal
tax models should not go against commonly held normative views (horizontal equity for example) and limit
complexity to a reasonable degree. The second implementation seems in line with these recommendations.
21Related implementations are of course possible where the tax function of another θ-type can be the labor
income tax schedule in place. The extreme case would just be to say that income taxes do not exist and all
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Proposition 4.4. A constrained Pareto optimal allocation in a two-period economy can be
implemented by a (compulsory) loan schedule L(z), a loan repayment schedule Γ(y, L), an
income tax T (y) and a savings tax T s(s), where
• L(z(θ)) = z(θ) + c1(θ)
• Γ(y(θ, a), L(z(θ))) = c2(θ, a˜(θ, y(θ, a)))− c2(θ, a) if y ∈ [y(θ, a), y(θ, a)]
and Γ(y(θ, a), L(z(θ))) = y(θ, a)− c2(θ, a) otherwise.
• T (y) = y − c2(θ, a˜(θ, y)) ∀ y ∈ [y(θ, a), y(θ, a)] and T = 0 otherwise.
• T s(s) as defined in Appendix A.5.
where a˜(θ, y) is the inverse of y(θ, ·) for a.
Proof. The budget constraint of an individual reads as:
c1(θ) + z(θ) ≤ L(z(θ))
c2(θ, a) ≤ y(θ, a)− T (y(θ, a))− Γ(y(θ, a), L(z(θ))),
which is equivalent to the budget constraint in Implementation 1 since by definition
G(z) = L(z) ∀ z and T (y, z) = T (y) + Γ(y, z) ∀ y, z. Hence it is a direct consequence of
Proposition 4.1.
The similarity to the other implementation is apparent. Optimal savings distor-
tions are implemented as before. Using the agents’ optimality conditions, one can
show that the education wedge equals
τz(θ) = L
′(z)−
∫ a
a
u′(c2(θ, a))
u′(c1(θ))
g(a|z(θ), θ)ΓL(y(θ, a), L(z(θ)))
dL(z(θ)
dz
da,
and the labor wedge equals
τy(θ, a) = T
′(y(θ, a)) + Γy(y(θ, a), L(z(θ))).
Education wedges are implemented by the non-linear loans schedule and how re-
payment varies with education level in a risk-adjusted manner weighted by u
′(c2(θ,a))
u′(c1(θ))
.
schedules that were interpreted as history-dependent labor income schedules in implementation 1 can now be
interpreted as repayment schedules. Taking the labor income tax schedule of the θ-type, however, seems to be
more natural in our view. Especially in our application of the theory in Section 5.
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The labor wedge is equal to the marginal tax rate and how loan repayment varies
with income.
Finally, note that in Proposition 4.1, we imposed the loans to be mandatory. This
is necessary because for some parameter specifications it might be possible that indi-
viduals might prefer not to take the government loan with income-contingent repay-
ment but rather to borrow at the risk free rate R. This is rather likely if the income-
contingent loan is such that on average one pays back much more than the loan size,
i.e. the expected difference is more than the risk premium. To deal with this prob-
lemwithout making the income-contingent loans compulsory, one could add ex-ante
participation constraints that guarantee voluntary participation in the loan program.
Technically this would be similar to changing the Pareto weights in favor of those
who would otherwise opt out of the loan program. As we will show in the applica-
tion of the model in Section 5, our main qualitative result does not vary a lot along the
Pareto frontier andwe therefore conjecture that adding such participation constraints
would not change that result significantly.
4.2.2 T Periods
We will now show to what extent these results carry over to the case of T periods.
Corollary 4.5. Any constrained Pareto optimal allocation in a T-period economy can be im-
plemented by a (compulsory) loan schedule L(z), a loan repayment schedule Γt(yt, L), an
income tax Tt(yt) and a savings tax T s(s).
In the same way as Corollary 4.2 follows from Proposition 4.1, this Corollary fol-
lows from Proposition 4.4, we therefore omit a formal proof. Next, we use Assump-
tion 4 to overcome the dependence of these policy instruments on the histories of
incomes.
Corollary 4.6. Assume that Assumption 4 holds. Then any constrained Pareto optimal allo-
cation in a T-period economy can be implemented by a Loan schedule L(z), a Loan Repayment
Schedule Γ(y, L) that is constant over time, an income tax T (y) that is constant over time and
a savings tax T s(s).
Again we omit a formal proof as the result follows from Corollary 4.5 in the same
way as Corollary 4.3 follows from Corollary 4.2. The implementation is appealing
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since is there is only one labor tax schedule and a yearly income-contingent repay-
ment plan for each loan size.
5 An Application of the Model: College vs. High-School
We now present an empirically driven application of our model. We limit education
to be a binary instead of a continuous choice. Agents either enter the labor market di-
rectly after high-school graduation or go to college before working. Additionally, we
restrict the analysis to two different levels of innate ability.22 These simplifications en-
able us to parameterize the model using factual and, importantly, estimated counter-
factual earnings distributions from the empirical labor literature (Cunha and Heck-
man 2007, 2008). As laid out in Proposition 3.2, these counterfactual terms contribute
to optimal marginal tax rates by deterring deviations in the first period. Further, the
simplification has the advantage that it is easy to incorporate foregone earnings as an
implicit cost of education.
5.1 Parametrization
Agents live for 49 years after they graduate from high-school (age 16-65). Afterwards
they enter the labor market directly, or decide to go to college and graduate in four
years. We label the two innate types θHS and θCO and assume that it is a priori optimal
that θHS chooses the lower educational attainment (high school) and that θCO chooses
the higher educational attainment (college). The incentive constraints read as:
3∑
t=0
βtu(cE) +
48∑
t=4
βt
∫ a
a
vCO(a, θCO)g(a|CO, θCO)da
≥
48∑
t=0
βt
∫ a
a
vHS(a, θHS)g(a|HS, θCO), (8)
22This strong assumption implies that all individuals with the same education level are ex-ante equal, which
is clearly not realistic. It can be seen as an indispensable approximation, which we need to make in order to
identify innate types from real world data.
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and
48∑
t=0
βt
∫ a
a
vHS(a, θHS)g(a|HS, θHS)da
≥
3∑
t=0
βtu(cE) +
48∑
t=4
βt
∫ a
a
vCO(a, θCO)g(a|CO, θHS)da, (9)
where g(a|CO, θCO) and g(a|HS, θHS) are the probability density functions (pdfs) of
the factual ability distributions and g(a|HS, θCO) and g(a|CO, θHS) are the pdfs of the
counterfactual ability distributions. Note that college types now have to be compen-
sated for their foregone labor earnings, the implicit cost of college education. To get
the ability distributions, we take the factual and counterfactual earnings distributions
for high-school graduates plotted in Cunha and Heckman (2007) in Figures 1 and 2.23
After using a kernel smoother, we append Pareto tails at earnings of $88,000. Finally,
we smooth the resulting distribution again to overcome the kink from the appended
tail. Given a (linear) approximation of the real world tax system we calibrate the
implied skill distributions as input for the model from the optimality conditions of
the agents.24 We assume there is an atom of workers equal to five percent for each
distribution reflecting unemployment or disability as in Mankiw, Weinzierl and Ya-
gan (2009). The resulting calibrated skill distributions are illustrated in Figure 3. The
share of high school and college types are set to 64.19% and 35.81%, respectively, as
reported in Cunha and Heckman (2008). Following Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante
(2011), we set the annual monetary cost of college education to roughly a third of me-
dian income in our data. We use the same flow utility function, the yearly discount
factor and the interest rate as in Section 3.3.
23We used the software GetData Graph Digitizer to read out the data from the graphs. Since Cunha and
Heckman (2007) consider the present value of lifetime earnings (18-65), we take a 47 years annuity with the
same present value, i.e. we take something similar to average annual earnings.
24Saez (2001) has pioneered the approach to calibrate skills distributions from actual income distributions.
We employ the same approximation as in the calibration of the full model in Section 3.3. This has been found
to give a good fit to the US tax system by Jacquet, Lehmann and Van der Linden (2010).
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5.2 Simulations of Optimal Policies
5.2.1 Baseline: Thick College Tails and Utilitarian Welfare Function
To the best of our knowledge, there exists no systematic evidence on the conditional
distributions of top incomes for college graduates and non-graduates separately. In
the baseline case, we assume thicker tails for college graduates. For college gradu-
ates, we choose a Pareto parameter of 1.28, such that the ratio between the average
income of individuals with income above the Pareto threshold is 4.5 relative to the
threshold. For high-school graduates we use a Pareto parameter of 3, such that this
ratio is 1.5. These values lie within the range of what has been typically found in
empirical studies covering many countries and time periods (Atkinson, Piketty and
Saez 2011). These top tails are not dependent on innate type θ but are just determined
by the education level. Importantly, we explore deviations from these assumptions
on top incomes below. We start with the natural benchmark of a Utilitarian social
welfare function but investigate optimal policies along the Pareto frontier below.
Optimal Labor Wedges: Figure 4(a) displays the optimal labor wedges as a func-
tion of yearly income up to $300,000. Both schedules follow a U-shaped pattern, re-
flecting a seminal result from the static Mirrlees problem (Diamond 1998, Saez 2001).
The intuition for the pattern is simple: for very low incomes, marginal distortions are
high for two reasons: first distorting their labor supply is relatively harmless since
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Figure 4: Utilitarian OptimumWith Thick College Tails
they are rather unproductive. Second the inverse hazard rate 1−G(a|·,·)
g(a|·,·)
is rather high.
Note that 1 − G(a|·, ·) is proportional to the additional revenue generated by the (im-
plicit or explicit) marginal tax rate and g(a|·, ·) is the mass of individuals whose labor
supply is distorted. For intermediate incomes the density g(a|·, ·) strongly increases
making distortions more and more harmful, leading to a decrease in optimal dis-
tortions. Finally, due to the properties of the Pareto distribution, the ratio 1−G(a|·,·)
ag(a|·,·)
converges to a constant and as a consequence the labor wedges start to converge.25
Looking at Figure 3, one can see in which way tax distortions are tailored to the
different skill/earnings distributions. At every point of the skill support before the
Pareto tail kicks in, college labor distortions generate much bigger mechanical rev-
enue effects for the government, which are reinforced by income effects. In the top
income tails, the difference in the wedges also converges to a constant.26
Repayment Schedule: We now build on the implementation results from the pre-
vious section and illustrate optimal income-contingent repayment schedules. The
(common) labor income tax schedule is determined by the high-school labor wedges.
Figure 4(b) shows the yearly repayment of college debt as a function of income. The
dotted line represents the annuity value of the loan, for comparison.
25See Saez (2001) for an elaborated discussion.
26All these results are related to the simulations of Luttmer and Zeckhauser (2008) who consider a static
setting where going to college is purely a signal and not an investment; hence counterfactual and factual
distributions are equal. One consequence of this is that labor wedges are very high for people without college
degree but high income. The reason is that the effectiveness of deterring θCO-types to mimick θHS-types by
increasing labor wedges of θHS-types is increasing in the difference between the counterfactual distribution of
the college type and the factual distribution of the high school type.
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The slope of the repayment schedule is given by the difference in the labor wedges, as
we laid out in the previous section. As the college wedge lies above the high-school
wedge, repayment is increasing in income. In the tails the difference is constant and
the repayment schedule becomes linear. Interestingly, also for lower income levels
the slope of the schedule can be well approximated by a linear function.
As discussed at the end of Section 4.2.1, adding an ex-ante participation constraint
to the problem that assures that the college type prefers the income-contingent loan
over a loan from the private market should have a very similar effect like increas-
ing the Pareto weight on the college type. Consequences for optimal policies should
hence be similar as in Section 5.2.3 where we vary the Pareto weights
Relatedly, and as obvious from the Figure 4(b), graduates with income above US-
$60,000 pay back more than the (present) value of their loans in this example. It
would also be interesting to introduce ex-post participation constraints, such that for
no college graduate actual repayment exceeds the loan value by a certain amount.
As repayment is strictly increasing in income, at least in our benchmark case, there
would be a threshold, such that the constraint would be binding for all incomes above
a certain level.
5.2.2 The Role of Pareto Tails
We now test if and how different assumption on top incomes across income distri-
butions changes the results. First, we look at the case where all distributions (factual
and counterfactual) share a common Pareto parameter of two. Figures 5(a) and 5(b)
display the corresponding schedules. It shows that the college labor wedge still lies
above the high-school labor wedge, for incomes up to roughly US-$60,000, which
leads to an increasing repayment schedule. Although the distribution share a com-
mon Pareto parameter, top labor wedges do not convergence to the exact same level
because of the incentive effect we identified in the theory part and income effects. Top
labor wedges become very similar, however, leading to repayment above US-$60,000
being slightly U-shaped, but relatively flat.
Next, we use a Pareto parameter of 1.28 for the θCO-type and 3 for θHS-types – but
in both cases independently from the college entry decision, so that the tails are type-
dependent. The corresponding graphs (Figure 7(a) and 7(b)) appear in the appendix.
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Figure 5: Utilitarian OptimumWith Identical Tails
As is obvious from the figures, the schedules are almost identical to the education-
dependent baseline case we studied in Section 5.2.1. This is driven by the fact that in
both scenarios the equilibrium implies that the distribution for college graduates al-
ways has a thicker tail than the one for high-school graduates. What changes across
the two scenarios are the counterfactual distributions, which only have a minor im-
pact on the shape of the optimal schedules, however.
Lastly, we do not append a Pareto tail but work directly with the calibrated skill
distributions. The graphs (Figure 8(a) and 8(b)) in the Appendix reveal that college
labor wedges lie above their high school counterpart through the whole range of
incomes, leading to an increasing repayment schedule.
5.2.3 Exploring the Pareto Frontier
Wenext aim to study optimal policies along the Pareto frontier by varying theweights
f˜HS and f˜C , going back to our baseline specification with thick college tails. We start
with the a case of a Rawslian Planner, i.e. f˜HS = 1 and f˜C = 0. As shown in the
Appendix (Figures 9(a) and 9(b)), the general shape of the schedules is unaffected.
This also holds for less redistributive (fHS ≤ f˜HS ≤ 1) weights between the Rawlsian
and Utilitarian points. We simulate cases where the planner puts a higher weight on
college types, such that the incentive constraint binds in the other direction. Figures
10(a) and 10(b) in the Appendix show such a case, where all the weight is on the
college type. Even in this extreme case the main conclusions remain unaffected.
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5.3 The Welfare Gains From Income-Contingent Repayment
In the previous section, we have illustrated how optimal income-contingent repay-
ment schedules may look like. As an important next step, we aim at quantifying
what the potential welfare effects of income-contingency might be. The natural pol-
icy comparison is the case where repayment is not contingent on income and there is
a single income tax schedule; i.e. concerning allocations, the restriction is that indi-
viduals with the same income should face the same labor wedge. Concerning education
subsidies or savings taxes, we do not impose any restriction. We view this as the nat-
ural policy comparison since this is the situation that is true for most countries. The
challenge is to incorporate this restriction – that the labor wedge should be a function
of income only – into a Pareto problem. With income effects this problem is gener-
ally not tractable. Whenever individuals differ in their savings, individuals with the
same wage will choose a different labor supply y; hence it is not clear how to screen
individuals given this restriction on policy instruments. In contrast, assuming away
income effects by considering the following utility function
U(c, y, a) = u
(
c−Ψ
(
y
a
))
(10)
makes the problem tractable: in any implementation where labor wedges are only
a function of current skills, we know that everyone with the same current skill a will
choose the same level of income. Hence the restriction that the labor wedge is only a
function of current income is equivalent to:27
y(θ, a) = y(a). (11)
Such a restriction can easily be incorporated into a Pareto problem. The following
proposition states how a Pareto optimal allocation subject to (11) can be implemented
in the binary model.28
27For the numerical simulations in this subsection, we assume that the allocation is constant within the
working period. In general this might not be true for non-separable preferences. Since the main focus of our
analysis is to compare history-independent with history-dependent instruments and this constant allocation
assumption is made for both cases, we conjecture that it does not bias our result significantly.
28Naturally, another implementation of this optimum would involve a single labor tax schedule with dif-
ferential lump-sums and education grants offered by the government.
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Proposition 5.1. Assume that preferences satisfy (10) and that the allocation is constant
within the working period. Then any Pareto optimal allocation subject to private information
and (11) can be implemented by a loan for college students L, a yearly loan repayment Γ and
an income tax T (y) that is constant over time, where these policy instruments satisfy
• T (y(a)) = y(a)− c(θHS , a)
• Γ = c(θHS , a)− c(θCO, a)
• L =
∑3
t=0 β
tcE + z.
Note that there is no need for a savings tax since the intertemporal wedge remains
undistorted between the college and the working period. Due to the absence of
income effects and in contrast to the case with separable preferences, the standard
inverse Euler equation argument for a savings distortion does not apply, although
agents are risk-averse. The argument for a savings distortion due to nonseparable
preferences as in Golosov, Troshkin and Tsyvinski (2011) also does not apply since
in the education period utility is only given by consumption so there is no interac-
tion with labor effort.29 Finally, note that Assumption 4 is not needed since the tax
arbitrage idea does not apply in the absence of income effects.
This theoretical result is very helpful for gauging the welfare gains, which stem
from the income-contingency of the educational loans. If we compared our results
with the case of linear policy instruments, for example, it would be unclear whether
the welfare losses were mainly due to the inability of using history-dependent la-
bor distortions (i.e. income-contingency) or from the inability of using nonlinear
policy instruments. Weinzierl (2011a) follows a similar approach when estimating
the welfare gains of age-dependent taxation comparing non-linear labor taxes across
scenarios. Due to the quasi-linearity assumption on preferences, we can make use of
a first-order approach to the incentive constraints and therefore look at a very fine
type space exploiting more empirical knowledge about the skill distributions. Our
welfare gains are also related to Farhi andWerning (2012) and Golosov, Troshkin and
Tsyvinksi (2011), who compare their optimal policies in a life-cycle framework with
29With an effort cost of education, which is not separable from consumption the savings wedge would be
non-zero in general.
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Thick College Tails Same Tails
Utilitarian Rawlsian Utilitarian Rawlsian
ρ ≈ 1 0.19% 0.26% 0.17% 0.16%
ρ = 2 0.37% 0.32% 0.32% 0.29%
ρ = 3 0.50% 0.46% 0.44% 0.47%
ρ = 4 0.62% 0.58% 0.54% 0.51%
Table 1: Welfare Gains from Income-Contingency
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Figure 6: Welfare Gains as Function of Risk Aversion
age dependent and age independent linear taxes.
For the simulations we work with a CRRA specification so that:
U(c, y, a) =
(
c−
(y/a)σ
σ
)1−ρ
1− ρ
,
with σ = 3 as before, implying a constant elasticity of 0.5. We aim to explore the
welfare gains from income-contingent repayment schemes and how sensitive these
gains are to different assumptions about risk-aversion and the social welfare func-
tion. In Table 1 and Figures 6(a) and 6(b) we present the consumption equivalent
welfare gains as the CRRA parameter ρ varies from (slightly above) 1 to 4. For the
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social welfare function, we focus on the two most popular cases in the literature, the
Utilitarian case with fHS = f˜HS and fC = f˜C and the Rawlsian case with f˜HS = 1. We
assume thicker college tails as in the previous section in one case and – more conser-
vatively – identical tails in the other case.
In the parametrization matching our baseline scenario with ρ = 2, thicker college
tails and a Utilitarian planner, we find a respectable gain of 0.37% lifetime consump-
tion. 30 Interestingly, the gains are almost everywhere higher for a Utilitarian plan-
ner. Intuitively, the individuals who gain the most from an income-contingent re-
payment scheme are college graduates with relatively low earnings. By assumption,
the Rawlsian planner places no weight on college graduates, explaining why history
dependence is actually more valuable for the Utilitarian planner. Next, the gains
are increasing in risk-aversion almost across the whole support of ρ. This is to be
expected for both the Utilitarian and the Rawlsian planner since history-dependent
labor wedges in general improve insurance especially for low income states, which
is valued more highly as risk-aversion increases.31 Finally, comparing the left and
right panel, as expected, the welfare gains from income-contingency are higher if the
income distributions differ in their tails. With thicker college tails, it becomes more
valuable for the planner to differentiate labor distortions. In line with this, the opti-
mal history-independent tax schedules always lie in between the optimal college and
high-school history-dependent labor wedges.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the implications of endogenous education decisions
before labor market entry on Pareto optimal tax policies in a dynamic environment
with heterogeneous agents and uncertainty. An attractive way to decentralize Pareto
optimal allocations is to have the government support students to finance consump-
tion and tuition during education. During their working life students pay back these
loans, contingent on income and loan size. Our paper therefore makes a second-best
30The numbers are almost identical when we take type-dependent tails.
31Over a small range with thick college tails for the Rawlsian planner the gains are slightly decreasing in
risk-aversion. When risk-aversion is small, college types are more responsive to differential labor wedges for
top incomes. Then it can be more important for the planner to tailor labor wedges according to the incentive
effect described in Section 3. As our results show, however, this effect is second-order.
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argument in favor of student loans with income-contingent repayment rates and, in
addition, provides guidance for the optimal design of such repayment schedules.
We have put the model to work illustrating these policy recommendations for the
case of a binary education choice: graduating from college or entering the labor mar-
ket directly after high-school. We found the optimal repayment plan for college loans
to be increasing at an almost linear rate for low and intermediate incomes, whereas
the slope for top incomes hinges on the assumed distribution of top incomes. Inter-
estingly, this qualitative result holds along a large part of the Pareto frontier. The
welfare gains from using income-contingent repayment rates (history-dependent la-
bor wedges) relative to non-contingent loans (labor wedges that are only a function
of income) range from 0.2% to 0.6% of lifetime consumption for CRRA parameters
ranging from one to four. Two key parameters for more definite policy conclusions
are the two Pareto coefficients measuring the thickness of the tails for top incomes. It
would be very valuable to obtain empirical estimates for different education levels to
inform optimal policies. In addition, one could distinguish between different college
majors, as the risk properties are probably very different across majors.
We have abstracted from several aspects that can be tackled in future work. First,
we have abstracted from initial wealth heterogeneity. In an environment where indi-
viduals differ concerning the income and wealth of their parents, typically the ques-
tion arises to what extent optimal education policies should depend on parents’ in-
come and wealth. Very related to this question, Gelber and Weinzierl (2012) have re-
cently taken up the task of showing how the optimal history-independent tax system
changes, when children’s abilities depend on parents’ financial resources. Second,
due to our assumption that all labor market risk is realized directly after labor mar-
ket entry, some aspects concerning the optimal timing of repayment were naturally
disregarded. Relatedly, we did no consider human capital accumulation after labor
market entry like on-the-job training. Third, we assumed full commitment to all poli-
cies from the government side. Relaxing these assumptions might be a fruitful area
for future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Properties of the Laissez-Faire Allocation
To show part (iv), we show that:
∂2U(s, z; θ, .)
∂s∂θ
= −β
∫ a
a
∂2v2(a, s)
∂s∂a
∂G(a|z, θ)
∂θ
da (12)
= −β
∫ a
a
∂y(s, a)
∂s
[
Ψ′
(
y(s, a)
a
)
1
a2
+Ψ′′
(
y(s, a)
a
)
y(s, a)
a2
]
∂G(a|z, θ)
∂θ
da < 0
∂2U(s, z; θ, .)
∂s∂z
(13)
= u′′(c1(θ)− β
∫ a
a
∂y(s, a)
∂s
[
Ψ′
(
y(s, a)
a
)
1
a2
+Ψ′′
(
y(s, a)
a
)
y(s, a)
a2
]
∂G(a|z, θ)
∂z
da < 0
∂2U(s, z; θ, .)
∂z∂θ
= −β
∫ a
a
∂v2(a, s)
∂a
∂2G(a|z, θ)
∂z∂θ
da > 0, (14)
applying the envelope theorem and integrating by parts several times, as well as all
three assumptions on the conditional distribution function. Also note that ∂y(s,a)∂s < 0
because of the income/wealth effect on labor supply.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Consider some admissible reporting strategy r(θ) = θ′.
∂U(θ, θ′)
∂r(θ)
= uc
(
c1
(
θ′
)) ∂c1(θ′)
∂r(θ)
+ β
∫ a
a
∂v2(θ
′, a)
∂r(θ)
g(a|z(θ′), θ)da
+
∂z(θ′)
∂r(θ)
∫ a
a
v2(θ
′, a)
∂g(a|z(θ′), θ)
∂z(θ′)
da
and
0 =
∂U(θ′, θ′)
∂r(θ)
= uc
(
c1
(
θ′
)) ∂c1(θ′)
∂r(θ)
+ β
∫ a
a
∂v2(θ
′, a)
∂r(θ)
g(a|z(θ′), θ′)da
+
∂z(θ′)
∂r(θ)
∫ a
a
v2(θ
′, a)
∂g(a|z(θ′), θ′)
∂z(θ′)
da
Subtracting from one another gives:
∂U(θ, θ′)
∂r(θ)
= β
∫ a
a
[
∂v2(θ
′, a)
∂r(θ)
(
g(a|z(θ′), θ)− g(a|z(θ′), θ′)
)
+
∂z(θ′)
∂r(θ)
v2(θ
′, a)
(
∂g(a|z(θ′), θ)
∂z(θ′)
−
∂g(a|z(θ′), θ′)
∂z(θ′)
)]
da.
We are now looking when this last expression always has the same sign as the dif-
ference (θ − θ′), which is clearly sufficient for global incentive compatibility. For
(θ − θ′) > 0, by Assumption 2, the first line is positive if ∂v2(θ
′,a)
∂r(θ)
or equivalently ∂v2(θ,a)∂θ
in a truthful mechanism is increasing in a. This can be shown to be equivalent to
∂y(θ,a)
∂θ > 0 using the envelope theorem. The second line is positive if
∂z(θ′)
∂r(θ)
> 0 or
equivalently ∂z(θ)∂θ > 0 in a truthful mechanism. The last condition (iii) is a routine
exercise and a proof can be found, for example in Salanié (2003).
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A.3 Second Best Policies: Pareto Problem and Optimality Conditions
After integrating by parts and using the transversality conditions η(θ) = η(θ) = 0 as
well as µ(θ, a) = µ(θ, a) = 0 ∀ θ, the Lagrangian for the social planner’s problem reads
as
max
c1(θ),v2(θ,a),z(θ),y(θ,a)
∫ θ
θ
u(c1(θ))dF˜ (θ)
+ β
∫ θ
θ
∫ a
a
v2(θ, a)dG(a|z(θ), θ)dF˜ (θ)
+
1
R
λR
∫ θ
θ
∫ a
a
y(θ, a)dG(a|z(θ), θ)dF (θ)
−
1
R
λR
∫ θ
θ
∫ a
a
u−1 [v2(θ, a) + Ψ (y(θ, a)/a)] dG(a|z(θ), θ)dF (θ)
− λR
∫ θ
θ
(c1(θ) + z(θ)) dF (θ)
−
∫ θ
θ
∫ a
a
(
µ′(θ, a)v2(θ, a) + µ(θ, a)Ψ
′
(
y(θ, a)
a
)
y(θ, a)
a2
)
dadθ
−
∫ θ
θ
η′(θ)
[
u(c1(θ)) + β
∫ a
a
v2(θ, a)dG(a|z(θ))da
]
dθ
− β
∫ θ
θ
η(θ)
∫ a
a
v2(θ, a)
∂g(a|z(θ), θ)
∂θ
dadθ
With first-order conditions:
u′(c1(θ))(f˜(θ)− η
′(θ))− λRf(θ) = 0 (c1SB)
(
f˜(θ)− η′(θ)
)
βg(a|z(θ), θ)− λR
1
R
1
u′(c2(θ, a))
g(a|z(θ), θ)f(θ)− µ′(θ, a)
− β
∂g(a|z (θ) , θ)
∂θ
η(θ) = 0 (v2SB)
46
1R
λRg(a|z(θ), θ)f(θ)− µ(θ, a)
[
Ψ′′
(
y(θ, a)
a
)
y(θ, a)
a3
+
1
a2
Ψ′
(
y(θ, a)
a
)]
−
1
R
λRg(a|z(θ), θ)f(θ)
Ψ′
(
y(θ,a)
a
)
au′(c2(θ, a))
= 0, (ySB)
f˜(θ)β
∫ a
a
v2(θ, a)
∂g(a|z(θ), θ)
∂z(θ)
da+
1
R
λRf(θ)
∫ a
a
∂g(a|z(θ), θ)
∂z(θ)
(y(θ, a)− c2(θ, a)) da
−η′(θ)β
∫ a
a
v2(θ, a)
∂g(a|z(θ), θ)
∂z(θ)
da− βη(θ)
∫ a
a
v2(θ, a)
∂2g(a|z(θ), θ)
∂z(θ)∂θ
da− λRf(θ) = 0 (zSB)
A.4 Proofs of Propositions 3.4-3.3
A.4.1 Proposition 3.4
Combining equations (c1SB) and (v2SB) and integrating directly gives the result.
A.4.2 Proposition 3.2
Rewriting (ySB):
λRg(a|z(θ), θ)f(θ)

1− Ψ′
(
y(θ,a)
a
)
au′(c1(θ, a))


−Rµ(θ, a)
[
Ψ′′
(
y(θ, a)
a
)
y(θ, a)
a3
+
1
a2
Ψ′
(
y(θ, a)
a
)]
= 0.
Dividing by Ψ
′
au′ and λRg(a|z, θ)f(θ) and using the definition of the labor wedge, i.e.
u′(1− τy) = Ψ
′ 1
a yields
τy(θ, a)
1− τ(θ, a)
= R
µ(θ, a)
λRg(a|z(θ), θ)f(θ)a
[
Ψ′′ ya2 +Ψ
′ 1
a
Ψ′
au′
]
,
which can be written as
τy(θ, a)
1− τ(θ, a)
= R ·
µ(θ, a)
λRg(a|z(θ), θ)f(θ)a
1 + εu(θ, a)
εc(θ, a)
,
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where Ψ
′ 1
a
Ψ′′ y
a2
+Ψ′ 1
a
=
1+εu(θ,a)
εc(θ,a)
can be shown by simple algebra, see Saez (2001, p.227).
In particular, with the isoelastic specification used in the computations (y/a)
σ
σ one can
verify that this term is equal to 1σ .
The multiplier µ(θ, a) can be obtained using (v2SB) and (c1SB):
µ(θ, a) =
λRf(θ)
u′(c1(θ))
βG(a|z(θ), θ)−
λR
R
f(θ)
∫ a
a
1
u′(c2(θ, a∗))
dG(a∗|z(θ), θ)
−β
∂G(a|z(θ), θ)
∂θ
η(θ∗),
yielding:
τy(θ, a)
1− τ(θ, a)
=
1 + εu(θ, a)
εc(θ, a)
u′(c2(θ, a))
ag(a|z(θ), θ)
[A(θ, a) + B(θ, a)]
where
A(θ, a) =
βRG(a|z(θ), θ)
u′(c1(θ))
−
∫ a
a
1
u′(c2(θ, a∗))
dG(a∗|z(θ), θ)
B(θ, a) = −
1
f(θ)λR
βR
∂G(a|z(θ), θ)
∂θ
η(θ).
Using the inverse Euler equation, the term A(θ, a) can be written as in Proposi-
tion 3.4.
From (c1SB), η(θ) is given by:
η(θ) = F˜ (θ)− λR
∫ θ
θ
1
u′(c1(θ))
f(θ)dθ.
The direct benefit of raising utils for agents with skill lower than θ is F˜ (θ). The mon-
etary cost is
∫ θ
θ
1
u′(c1(θ))
f(θ)dθ, transformed into welfare units by λR.
Relation to the formula of Saez (2001)
The insurance part of the labor wedge can be expressed as in Saez (2001), for our
case with separable preferences. This relation applies if agents do not differ ex-ante.
By some abuse of notation, then B(θ, a) = 0 and for A(θ, a), using the inverse Euler
equation, we obtain
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A(θ, a) =
∫ a
a
G(a|z(θ), θ)
u′(c2(θ, a∗))
dG(a∗|z(θ), θ)−
∫ a
a
1
u′(c2(θ, a∗))
dG(a∗|z(θ), θ)
=
∫ a
a
G(a|z(θ), θ)
u′(c2(θ, a∗))
dG(a∗|z(θ), θ)−
∫ a
a
1
u′(c2(θ, a∗))
dG(a∗|z(θ), θ)
+
∫ a
a
1
u′(c2(θ, a∗))
dG(a∗|z(θ), θ)
=
∫ a
a
1
u′(c2(θ, a∗))
dG(a∗|z(θ), θ)−
∫ a
a
1−G(a|z(θ), θ)
u′(c2(θ, a∗))
dG(a∗|z(θ), θ)
where the second equality follows from the transversality condition. This term can
be expressed as in Saez (2001) as shown by Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan (2009) in
their online appendix.
A.4.3 Proposition 3.3
Plugging c1SB into zSB gives:
λRf(θ)
u′(c1(θ))
β
∫ a
a
v2(θ, a)
∂g(a|z(θ), θ)
∂z(θ)
da+
1
R
λRf(θ)
∫ a
a
∂g(a|z(θ), θ)
∂z(θ)
(y(θ, a)− c2(θ, a)) da
− βη(θ)
∫ a
a
v2(θ, a)
∂2g(a|z(θ), θ)
∂z(θ)∂θ
da− λRf(θ) = 0
Proposition 3.3 directly follows.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Starting from a direct mechanism we show in four steps that optimal allocations can
indeed be implemented with the policy instruments as defined in Proposition A.5.
This idea strongly builds upon the work of Werning (2011).
Step 1: Introduce savings
Imagine the constrained efficient allocation is implemented by a direct mechanism.
From that point on, assume that individuals could freely save s. Let r1 denote the
report about θ. With savings tax T s(s, r1), the budget constraints read as
c˜1(r1) + s = c1(r1) (15)
49
c˜2(r1, r2) = c2(r1, r2) +Rs− T
s(s, r1) (16)
Define the optimal report r2 about a, for a given report r1 about θ, a given savings
tax schedule T s(s, r1) and a given level of savings s:
r∗2(a, r
1, s, T s) = argmax
r2
u [c2(r1, r2) +Rs− T
s(s, r1)]− ψ
(
y(r1, r2)
a
)
Then the optimal report in period one, for a given level of savings and a given
savings tax schedule T s(s, r1), is defined by
r∗1(θ, s, T
s(r1, s)) = argmax
r1
u(c1(r1)− s)
+ β
∫ a
a
u [c2(r1, r
∗
2) +Rs− T
s(s, r1)]− ψ
(
y(r1, r
∗
2)
a
)
dG(a|z(r1), θ) (17)
Then define a hypothetical tax schedule T ∗(r1, s, θ) for each θ implicitely by
V (θ) = V (θ, s, r∗1, T
∗(r1, s, θ)) ∀ s.
This hypothetical tax schedule would make individuals of type θ indifferent between
truth telling and the optimal joint deviation for any s. It is hypothetical since it does
not only depend on the report r1, which is observable but also on the unobservable
type θ. However, we know that for each θ such a tax schedule exists. Therefore taking
the upper envelope over these functions yields a savings tax function Tˆ (s, r1) that also
implements zero savings:
Tˆ (s, r1) = sup
θ
T ∗(r1, s, θ) (18)
Lemma A.1. A constrained efficient allocation can be implemented by a direct mechanism
extended by a savings choice and history-dependent savings tax schedules Tˆ s(s, r1).
Step 2: Make the savings tax history-independent
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A simple way to make the savings tax history-independent is to take the upper
envelope of all functions T s(s, r1), i.e.
T s(s) = sup
r1
Tˆ s(s, r1). (19)
Lemma A.2. A constrained efficient allocation can be implemented by a direct mechanism
extended by a savings choice and a history-independent savings tax schedule T s(s).
Note that this savings tax function T s(s) is not differentiable and implies zero sav-
ings. AsWerning (2011) shows one can, using Ricardian equivalence arguments, also
construct a history-independent savings tax function that is differentiable and yields
non-zero savings choices.
Step 3: Allow for labor-leisure decisions
To get closer to a decentralized implementation now assume the following ex-
tended direct mechanism.
1. Individuals report r(θ)
2. They get assigned ’income to consume’ c1(θ)
3. They face the savings tax schedule T s(s) and save s(θ) = 0
4. In period two, instead of directly revealing their type, individuals of type θ face
an income tax schedule that is defined by
T (y(θ, a), θ) = y(θ, a)− c2(θ, a)) ∀ a
By the same arguments as in the standard Mirrlees model it follows that this ex-
tended direct mechanism can also implement the constrained efficient allocations.
We can summarize this in the following lemma.
Lemma A.3. A constrained efficient allocation can be implemented by a direct mechanism in
the first period extended by a savings choice and a history-independent differentiable savings
tax schedule T˜ s(s) and a history-dependent labor income tax schedule T (Y, z) in period two.
Step 4: Complete Decentralization - allow for educational investment
1. Individuals buy (or tell the government that they want to buy) z(θ) units of
education
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2. They get assigned a student loan G(z(θ)) = c1(θ)+z(θ) (and are obliged to actually
buy z(θ) units of education)
3. They face the savings tax schedule T s(s) and save s(θ) = 0
4. in period two, instead of directly revealing their type, individuals of type θ face
an income tax schedule that is defined by
T (y(θ, a), z(θ)) = y(θ, a)− c2(θ, a) ∀ a
Since the mechanism in step 4 is just a reformulation of the mechanism in step 3
this directly leads us to Proposition 4.1.
A.6 Proof of Corollary 4.2
Once θ is revealed, it is a direct consequence of Werning (2007, Appendix IV) that
there exists a tax system Tt(yt) for every θ that leads to truth telling of a conditional
on θ being revealed. It then directly follows that a capital tax as defined in steps 2 of
Appendix A.5 combined with a grant schedule G(z)with G(z(θ)) = z(θ) + ce(θ)
∑Te
t=0 β
t
implements the optimum.
A.7 Graphs from Section 5
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Figure 7: Utilitarian OptimumWith Type Dependent Tails
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Figure 8: Utilitarian OptimumWith Thin Tails
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Figure 9: Rawlsian Optimum
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Figure 10: All Weight on College-Type
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